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The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code: Changes It Would Make
in Kentucky Law
LAURA L. Mumpmam*
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been widely touted
as the answer to most of the ills in the Consumer Credit area.
Nevertheless, various consumer groups, including the Consumer
Federation of America, have opposed adoption of the Code. The
Consumer Law center at Boston College, a part of the Office of
Economic Opportunity legal services system, has proposed an
alternative code, the National Consumer Act, which it represents
as a real consumer protection code.' The reason for this diver-
gence of views can be easily understood through a quick summary
of the code provisions.
The UCCC does provide at least a partial answer to many
consumer problems that have been the subject of much discussion.
There is a provision that would eliminate waiver of defenses and
the consequent holder-in-due course problem;2 however, there is
an alternative provision that would only limit it.3 There is a
cooling-off-period provision on home solicitation sales.4 There
* B.A., University of Kentucky (1963); J.D., University of Kentucky (1967);
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and may not represent the positions or policy of the Office of the Attorney
General.
I Turner, The UCCC: A Credit Code for Business, 60 Ky. L.J. 49 (1971).
2 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDT CODE § 2.404 alt. A [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.C.]. The holder in due course problem results when the seller transfers the
contract to a third party. If the goods are defective, the purchaser must still
make his payments to the third party and bring a separate action against the
seller, if the seller can be found. Since most consumer transactions involve rela-
tively small expenditures, the consumer cannot afford an attorney to bring suit.
U.C.C.C. § 240 alt. B.
4 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.501-.505. This would take care of the continuing problem
of the high pressure door-to-door salesman who talks a family into buying an
item they realize they can't afford the next day.
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are limitations on the collateral that may be taken in connection
with a consumer credit sale5 and limitations on the practice of
repossessing an item and also getting a default judgment in con-
nection with a consumer sale.6 Referral selling arrangements are
prohibited,7 as are assignments of earnings,8 confession of judg-
ments,9 and garnishment prior to judgment." Various restrictions
are placed upon garnishments after judgment,'1 including a pro-
vision that no employee shall be discharged because his wages
have been garnished. 2
On the other hand, the Code would do away with the present
usury provisions and would leave in their place rates that seem
very high. In consumer sales the maximum charges would be
either a straight eighteen percent or a varying rate of thirty-six
percent on the first $300, twenty-one percent on the next $700,
and eighteen percent on the remainder up to $25,000.13 If the
sale were for more than $25,000 there would be no limitations.' 4
On loans, the rates would be eighteen percent unless the lender
registered and filed certain forms so as to become a "supervised
lender." 5 If the lender went through the formalities of becoming
a supervised lender which are only token, 6 the rates would be
the same 36%-21%-15% arrangement that is provided for con-
sumer sale transactions.' There are no limitations on service
charge or loans on sales of over $25,000.18 These rates are much
higher than those being charged at the present by the vast majority
of merchants in consumer credit sales, and substantially higher
than the interest rates that any lending institution except small
loan companies are allowed to charge. Also the size of the loans
allowed are much higher than those presently allowed to small
loan companies. Regardless of the fights over the merits of the
5 U.C.C.C. § 2.407.6 U.C.C.C. § 5.103.
7 U.C.C.C. § 2.411.
8 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.410, 3.403.9 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.415, 3.407.
10 U.C.C.C. § 5.104.
11 U.C.C.C. § 5.105.12 U.C.C.C. § 5.106.
13U.C.C.C. §§ 2.201, 2.104, 2.602.
14 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.104, 2.605.
'5 U.C.C.C. § 3.201.
IG U.C.C.C. § 3.503.
17 U.C.C.C. § 3.508.18 U.C.C.C. §§ 3.104, 3.602.
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UCCC on a national basis, the first question for Kentucky con-
sumers must be whether or not the UCCC represents an overall
improvement in Kentucky law and secondly, whether or not the
same benefits might be obtained without the offsetting problems.
In this context it should be pointed out that this article is written
strictly from the consumer perspective by an unashamed consumer
advocate.
In looking at what the Code would or would not do in con-
nection with Kentucky law, it must first be remembered that the
Code only deals with consumer credit transactions. It does not
purport to be a general consumer fraud law, nor does it do away
with the critical need for comprehensive consumer legislation in
Kentucky.19 The Code does regulate the maximum charges on
consumer credit sales and loans, place certain limitations on pro-
visions that may be placed in consumer credit contracts and upon
creditors' remedies upon default, and prohibit certain practices in
connection with consumer credit sales. This article will compare
existing Kentucky law with major provisions of the Code, so as to
develop a clear picture of the changes that the Code would effect
in Kentucky.
A QuicK SummARY OF TlE CODE
The UCCC is divided into nine articles and each article into
subdivided parts. Article one is introductory. Article two con-
tains the materials on consumer credit sales, both maximum rates
and limitations on agreements. Article three deals with consumer
loans. Article four deals with insurance in connection with credit
sales. Article five deals with remedies and penalties. Article six
deals with administration of the Code. Article seven and eight
are reserved for future use. Article nine deals with effective date
and repealers.
Articles two and three are the heart of the Code. It is here that
the very important distinction between sales and loans is made-
19 As noted by Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, Robert V. Bullock
The UCCC is basically a consumer loan and credit law with incidental
consumer protection benefits. These incidental consumer protection
benefits cannot be construed as a substitute for consumer fraud or "Little
F.T.C. Act" which would normally be enforced by an Attorney General.
ThE OFFICE OF THE ATroNEY GENEAuL 405 (National Association of
Attorneys General Pub., 1971).
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article two dealing with sales, and article three dealing with loans.
Although there are many parallel provisions between articles two
and three, the noticeable absence from the loan article of some
of the safeguards provided in the sales article is one of the major
flaws of the Code, as will be pointed out later. Other than articles
two and three, this paper will only cover article five on remedies.
ARTicLE Two-CONSUMER CPBDrr SALES
There are two important aspects to article two. The first is the
setting of maximum rates on consumer credit sales. The second is
the limitations on consumer credit agreements that are provided.
Part two of the article would set maximum limitations on the
credit service charge that could be made on consumer credit sales
of thirty-six percent on the first $300, twenty-one percent on the
next $700, and fifteen percent on the remainder up to $25,000.20
Above $25,000 there would be no limits. 21 Part four of the article
would prohibit or do away with the effect of certain types of
provisions in consumer credit sales contracts. This is where most
of the consumer protection aspects of the Code are contained.
In addition, part five would provide a three day cooling off period
on home solicitation consumer credit sales which would allow a
purchaser to cancel a sale made in his home within three days
after the agreement.22
For the purpose of article two a consumer credit sale is defined
as any sale of up to $25,000 by a person in the business of making
such sales to an individual for a "personal, family, household, or
agricultural purpose" which is payable in installments, or on which
a credit service charge is made.23 Sales of homes where the interest
rate is less than ten percent are excluded.
Maximum Charges on Consumer Credit Sales
As has been pointed out, part two of article two would provide
for limitations on the credit service charge that could be made on
consumer credit sales. These limitations would be either a variable
20 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.201, 2.104, 2.602.
21 U.C.CC. § 2.605.
22 U.C.CC. § 2.502.
23 U.C.C.C. § 2.104.
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rate of thirty-six percent on the first $800, twenty-one percent on
the next $700, and fifteen percent on the remainder, or a straight
eighteen percent.24 It would also provide limitations for the
maximum credit service charge on revolving charge accounts,
which includes credit cards issued by a merchant for use in his
own store as well as open accounts where no credit card is in-
volved. 25 The limitations on revolving charge accounts would be
two percent per month up to $500, and one and one half percent
per month on the amount above $500.26 The rest of part two deals
with closing the loopholes that appear whenever a maximum
interest charge is set.27
At present under Kentucky law there is no limitation on credit
service charges in connection with consumer sales other than
automobiles. On automobiles the present limits are nine dollars
per hundred on a new car, thirteen dollars per hundred on a two
or three year old car, and fifteen dollars per hundred on an older
car.28 Although it would appear obvious that the general usury
law would apply in the absence of special statutory provisions,
there is a long line of Kentucky cases adopting the time-price
differential rule, which holds that it is permissible to have a
higher price for goods paid for on credit by charging two distinct
prices-one for credit and one for a cash sale-rather than to
charge interest on the credit sale.29 However, to state that there
are no limits at present on consumer credit sales in Kentucky
would not necessarily indicate that the limits of the Code would
necessarily be of benefit to the consumers of Kentucky. In the
first place, the time-price differential doctrine, which was at one
time almost universally accepted" has recently been seriously
challenged in many circles. A very recent decision, State v. 1. C.
Penney Co.,81 has held a revolving credit plan was usurious and
24 U.C.C.C. § 2.201.
25U.C.C.C. § 1.301(16).
26 UC.C.C. § 2.207(3).
27 U.C.C.C. § 2.202-.206, .208-.210.
28 Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter KRS], § 190.110(1) (Baldwin's 1969).29 Munson v. White, 217 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1949); Cartwright v. CIT Corp.,
70 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1934); McAlister v. Gingles, 50 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. 1932); Watts
v. Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Assn., 42 S.W. 839 (Ky. 1897); Eddy's Exr v. Northup,
23 S.W. 353 (Ky. 1893)- McCann's Ex'r v. Bell, 79 Ky. 112 (1880); Gruell v.
Smalley, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.5 359 (1864); Toussey Robinson, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 663
(1859); Berry v. Walker, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 464 (1849).
30 For a brief history see Comment, Retail Credit Sales & Usury, 24 LA. L.
REv. 822-42 (1964).31 179 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1970).
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was not exempted by the time-price doctrine. Challenges are
also presently being made in other states. Under these conditions,
the time price doctrine is no reason for the consumer to accept
extremely high limits as better than no limits.
Furthermore, the limits proposed by the code-thirty-six per-
cent on the first $300, twenty-one percent on the next $700, and
fifteen percent on the remainder are much higher than those rates
presently being charged by retailers in Kentucky. A representative
of the retailers recently said in a public committee meeting that
the present rate for installment buying in Kentucky is generally
eighteen percent with a few merchants charging up to twenty-four
percent. Thus, the establishment of a maximum rate of thirty-six
percent on the first $300, which includes most consumer trans-
actions, would allow a rate double that presently being charged.
Furthermore, the legalizing of such rates would remove any
possibility of general usury rates ever applying via a challenge
to the old time-price differential rule.
Limitations on Consumer Credit Sales Contracts
One of the most important consumer aspects of the UCCC is
the limitation on the holder in due course doctrine. This doctrine
can be invoked in two ways. Either the consumer sale contract
contains a separate negotiable instrument, or it contains a clause
which provides that the buyer will waive all defenses that he
might have against the seller if the contract is assigned to a third
party. The usual situation is a contract with a so-called "waiver
of defenses" clause. This has become a standard clause in every
consumer contract. Then ff the product fails after the contract
is assigned, the buyer must continue to make payments to the
assignee and seek whatever remedy he may have against the
seller. There is usually no effective remedy for the buyer, for one
of two reasons, either the seller has skipped town, or the amount
involved isn't enough to justify paying a lawyer and litigation
expenses.
The Code would attack this problem in two ways. Section
2.403 provides that no seller may take any negotiable instrument
other than a check in a consumer credit sale. Section 2.404 offers
two alternatives for dealing with the waiver of defense clause
problem. Alternative A would simply provide that a waiver of
1971]
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defense clause is unenforcible, and that any defense can be
asserted against the assignee up to the amount owing. Alternative
B would do the same thing. However, it would provide that the
buyer would have to notify the assignee of defenses existing at
the time of the assignment within a certain time after notice of
the assignment. But, the waiver of defense clause would still be
unenforceable as to any defense arising after the notice period.
Either alternative would offer a major improvement over existing
law.
The practice of taking a security interest in everything a con-
sumer owns to secure payment of a small debt is a widespread
credit abuse. The Code would limit this, but in consumer credit
sales only. Section 2.407 provides that a seller can only take a
security interest in the property sold, or in personal property to
which the item sold is attached if the debt is for $300 or more, or
in real property to which it is attached, if the debt is for $1,000
or more. Section 2.408 provides for situations where a buyer
has purchased two items from the same seller, and allows cross-
collateral in that instance, but only if the two sales are treated as
if consolidated for the purpose of setting maximum credit service
charges. Section 2.409 provides that when the amount owing
on the first item is paid off, the security interest on it is released.
This prevents the situation where the buyer only owes a small
amount, but the seller repossesses everything he has ever sold to
the buyer.
The other side of the collateral problem that the Code would
cover is the repossessing of the collateral and obtaining of a defi-
ciency judgment. Often when items are repossessed or seized under
a security agreement, they are sold for an amount substantially
less than their real value, often to the seller or a person acting
for the seller. Section 5.108 provides that a seller cannot both
repossess and obtain a deficiency judgment where the cash price
of the sale was $1,000 or less.
On the security interest and collateral problem, it must be
pointed out that the Code does not touch the problem of a lender
taking a security interest in everything the debtor owns to secure
a small debt. Nor does it prohibit a lender on default from taking
everything a debtor owns, buying it himself at the typical sale
at much less than its real value and then obtaining a deficiency
[Vol. 60
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judgment. In this respect it must be said that the Code is good
as far as it goes but that it does not go far enough. In a broader
context it must be pointed out that even the protections given
become meaningless through the exercise of a simple subterfuge.
All of these protections can be nullified by turning the transaction
into what is technically a cash sale and a loan, by simply taking
the purchaser across the street to a friendly loan company to get
a loan in the exact amount of the sale. The proceeds are then
turned over to the seller. In fact, under freedom of entry, as is
provided by the Code, there would be no need to go across the
street. The seller could open his own loan company, and the loan-
cash sale could be done on the premises. This is a very serious
weakness in the Code. It could be cured by a provision that a
lender would be subject to the defenses against the buyer in the
case of interlocking sales and loans. Section 2.407 of the National
Consumer Act has such a provision.
The cooling-off provision of article two is comprehensive. It
would provide that in any transaction where the sale is made by
personal solicitation at the buyers' home,32 the buyer has until
the close of the third business day after the sale to rescind the
contract.33 Insurance contracts are excepted by a general defini-
tion section. 4 An exception is made for emergencies.35 This ex-
ception may be too broad. The problem involved here is the
door-to-door salesman who, imposing upon Americans' natural
good manners and hesitancy to be impolite to anyone in their
homes, comes into a person's home and gives a high pressured
and often fraudulent or misleading sales pitch which results in the
individual making a large purchase which he didn't want or need,
and often couldn't afford. Further, the products are often seriously
overpriced. Every person who has any experience with consumer
problems knows of hundreds of such cases, ranging from the
"sample encyclopedia pitch," where the homeowner is being told
he is being given an encyclopedia and only has to purchase the
yearbooks and only later realizes he has signed a contract for
several hundred dollars, to the girl on her first job who is talked
into buying $300 worth of pots and pans which could be bought
32 U.C.C.C. § 2.501.
33 U.C.C.C. § 2.502.
34U.C.C.C. § 2.105(1).
35 U.C.C.C. § 2.502(5).
1971]
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in any store for $50. There is an acute need for such legislation
and its inclusion in the Code is one good feature for the consumer.
The prohibition against referral selling arrangements in the
code 6 is a good one, however, it is not new to Kentucky law. KItS
436.360 prohibits such provisions in a contract, and makes enter-
ing into such a contract a crime. It also provides for civil remedies
upon a suit by the Attorney-General. However, the Code provision
might be more effective, since it renders the contract void and
allows the buyer to retain the goods without any obligation to pay
for them.
ARTicLE Tm CONsuMER LoANs
The consumer loan provisions of the Code would employ the
rates presently allowed to be charged by petty loan companies on
small loans, raise the limitation on the size of loans to $25,000,
and allow all lenders to charge similar rates.T The other sig-
nificant development of the Code in this area is that it would take
off almost all restrictions on entering the business of lending money
to consumers. The theory for this rather startling change is that
with free entry competition will reduce the rates actually charged.
Maximum Rates on Consumer Loans
The UCCC provides that anyone can lend money at one to
eighteen percent per annum.38 To go above that rate, one simply
must obtain a license and become a supervised lender.3" There
are no capital requirements, or requirements of a showing that
another lender is needed in the credit market.40 A supervised
lender is allowed to charge rates comparable to those allowed on
consumer credit sales, thirty-six percent on the first $300, twenty-
one percent on the next $700, and fifteen percent on the remainder
up to $25,000.41 Above $25,000, or on loans that are not a con-
sumer or consumer related loan, there are no limits. 42 The general
usury statutes are repealed. 3
These rates are fairly comparable to those presently charged
36 U.C.C.C. § 2.411.
37 U.C.C.C. § 3.201.
38 Id.
3D U.C.C.C. §§ 3.501, .503.
40 U.C.C.C. § 3.503.
41 U.C.C.C. § 3.508.
42 U.C.C.C. § 3.605.
43 U.C.C.C. § 9.103.
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by petty loan companies, twenty dollars per hundred on the first
$800, sixteen dollars per hundred on the next $500, and thirteen
dollars per hundred on the next $400, or alternatively, three per-
cent per month on the first $800, two percent per month on the
next $700, and one per cent per month on the next $1200."4 A
maximum loan size of $1200 is provided.45 However, they are
substantially higher than the rates presently charged by banks,46
savings and loan associations, 47 and industrial loans companies48
on installment loans, which are between eleven and twelve
percent on the first $2,000, and between nine and ten per-
cent on the remainder up to the limits allowed, $3,500 for savings
and loans,49 $5,000 for industrial loans,50 and none for banks.
The various other provisions of the Code to close the loop-
holes on the actual interest rate charged are substantially paral-
lelled by existing provision in the present Kentucky statutes. As
has been pointed out earlier, the Code does not place any limita-
tions on the amount of security that may be taken for a loan, or
upon taking collateral and also obtaining a deficiency judgment,
although such limitations are placed on sales transactions.
Freedom of Entry
Freedom of entry would apparently only apply to stock type
companies since any kind of institution that accepted money for
deposit would still be subject to control. 1 However, under the
Code, as written, there would be no prohibition on opening a
loan company in any store, or carrying on a loan business in con-
nection with any other kind of business.2 Whether this would
lead to widespread competition and lower rates is not at all clear.
The framers of the Code think it will. However, this is a very
wide departure from prior thinking on this subject.
44 KRS § 288.530.
45 Id.
46 KRS § 287.215.
47 KRS § 289.461.
48 KRS H8 291.460-.470.
49 KRS § 289.461.
GO JKBS § 281.470.
51 U.C.C.C. § 1.108.
52 U.C.C.C. § 3.512.
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REMEDIES
Confessions of Judgments and Assignments of Earnings
As has been pointed out earlier, both article two on sales and
article three on loans prohibit provisions in a consumer credit
contract calling for either confessions of judgments or assignments
of earnings. Although, these are good, the benefit to Kentucky
consumers must be considered in light of Kentucky law.
Confession of judgments prior to the filing of an action are
illegal under Kentucky law, and have been for some time. KRS
372.140 which has been in effect before the codification of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes provides as follows:
(1) Any power of attorney to confess judgement or to suffer
judgement to pass by default or otherwise, and any release of
errors, given before an action is instituted, is void. (emphasis
added).
The code would be a little stronger here since there would be no
after trial exception.
The situation on assignment of earnings under Kentucky law
is not so clear-cut. Assignment of earnings are prohibited with
regard to installment loans by banks, 53 savings and loan associa-
tions,,4 and industrial loan companies. 5 Their use is allowed by
petty loan companies, but with severe restrictions .5  They are
not widely used by small loan companies. In addition, any assign-
ment of earnings of under $200 is severely restricted by KRS §
371.110-371.140, which requires among other things, the employ-
er's permission, which may be extremely difficult to get. In any
event, assignment of earnings is not widely used in Kentucky, even
where it is permitted. This provision then would be a theoretical
improvement, but without much practical effect.
Garnishment
The UCCC has elaborate provisions on garnishment, how-
ever, much is parallel to recent federal legislation in this area.
53 KRS § 287.215.
54 KRS § 289.461.5 KRS § 291.510.
56 KRS § 288.570.
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Kentucky has adopted almost identical language to the federal
law 7  and has obtained an exemption from the operation of the
federal act. There would be two substantial changes if the Code
were adopted. Rather than the presently restricted pre-judgment
garnishment there would be no pre-judgment garnishment at
all."a Secondly, in lieu of the present provision that an employee
cannot be discharged because of the garnishments arising from
one debt, there would be a provision that an employee could not
be discharged because of any number of garnishments. 9 These
undoubtedly would be substantial improvements for the con-
suners.
Unconscionability Clause
Section 5.108 provides that if a court finds a consumer credit
contract or any part of such to be unconscionable it may refuse to
enforce the agreement. This provision could be the most ad-
vantageous part of the Code to the consumer, since with sym-
pathetic reading by a court it could take care of many existing
abuses. This could provide an answer to many abuses associated
with consumer sales. However, a similar provision in the Uniform
Commercial Code, KRS § 355.2-302, has not lead to any wide-
spread benefits. Also the UCCC would allow the administrator
of the Code's provision (the administrator is provided for in article
six of the UCCC) to seek an injunction against any person engag-
ing in such contracts on a regular basis.
CONCLUSION
This summary has not covered some rather important areas
of the Code in order to concentrate on those considered most im-
portant. Article four on insurance would make some improve-
ments over existing law on the requirement and sale of insurance
in connection with credit sales. If the Code were adopted, there
are provisions in article six that would become very important,
including some rather broad powers in an administrator. I have
attempted to survey the major portions of the Code with special
67 Ky. Acts ch. 217 (1970). For the federal law see Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act, 15 USC § 1671-77 (1968).
58 Compare KBS § 425.185 and U.C.C.C. § 5.104.
59 Compare KRS § 425.180 and U.C.C.C, § $.106,
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regard to Kentucky consumers. Whether or not the Code repre-
sents enough improvement to offset its liabilities is a decision that
consumer groups are going to have to make before the 1972
Session of the General Assembly.
